E 467 
.1 

.n2 M64 
Copy 1 



JVFCLELLAN 



WHO HE IS 



AND 



WHAT HE HAS DONE. 



By G-EOKGE WILKES. 



PUBLISHED AT 201 WILLIAM STREET. 
SINCLAIR TUUSEY, VVnoLKSiiE Agent, 121 Nassau Street. 

1 S 6 2 . 



M^CLELLAN: 



ANr> 



WHAT HE HAS DONE. 



By aEOKQE WILKES- 



) ' ♦ «< > • t 



PUBLISHED AT 201 WILLIAM STREET. 
SINCLAIR TOUSEY, Wholbsalb Agbni, 121 Nassau Sirbet. 

18 6 2. 



■I 



The folio-wing article appeared on the 4th August, in "Wilkes' 
Spirit of the Times, and was the fifth of a weekly series, which Mr. 
Wilkes had preyioxisly published, to the same eflFect. It is rather 
remarkable, that the first of this series, which appeared on the 7th 
July, was followed in four days by the supersednre of McClellan 
as Oommander-in-Ohief of the Armies ; and that a few days subse- 
quent to the publication of the article we now reprint, General 
Halleck peremptorily ordered the Army of the Chickahominy out 
Of the Peninsula. It had been said by Mr. Wilkes, as early as July 
14th, that "McOlellan could never reach Richmorid from his per- 
plexed position on the James, except as a captive ; and that unless 
some leader, abler than himself, should extricate his stranded 
forces and restore them to the true base of operations, nothing but 
the providence of God could save him from capitulation." The 
Army of the Chickahominy is now back to where it started from 
five months ago, but it is reduced of its numbers by one-half, and 
ready to co-operate with Pope, along the line which McOlellan 
should never have abandoned. Further comment on the judgment 
and remarks of Mr. Wilkes is quite unnecessary. 

We have only to add, in explanation of the following article, that 
just previous to its appearance, General McOlellan had sent on 
Brigadiers Sickles and Meagher to New York to raise recruits, and 
that while General Meagher, in alluding to McOlellan, was satis- 
fied simply with glorifying him as a miraculous genius. General 
Sickles denounced all adverse criticism of his idol, as springing 
from "ignorance or traitorous motives." 

THE PUBLISHERS. 



By Transfer 

NUV 11 1922 



McCLELLAN-INSIDE AND OUT. 

" Mene, mene, tekel upharsin." 

IKaw York, August 4, 1862, > 

Ofpicb of Wilkbs' Spirit of the Times, j 

Th8 strategy of the dazzling military genius who led his troops 
into the marshes of the Ohiokahominy, only to run them out sc 
fast that he left his moaning wounded and his dead behind, ha- 
taken a new direction. Not having driven the enemy " to the 
wall " or conquered Kichmond, as he promised, he now meditates 
a march against New York, and has sent us a hrace of oratorical 
brigadiers, to straighten public sentiment, and teach us how to 
estimate true glory. "We were not aware he was so hard pushed 
by criticism ; but we have no doubt that he will be just as suc- 
cessful in this last effort, as he was in his superb operations on the 
James. 

The Commissioners he sends us are among the profoundest sol- 
diers of the age, and having had the full experience of a year in 
arms, are thoroughly qualified, not only to declare the degrees of 
warlike merit, but chartered to denounce all adverse question of 
their Young Napoleon, as proceeding "either from ignorance or 
traitorous motives." It is, perhaps, not a matter of much signifl. 
cance, that these veteran disciples of Marlborough and Vauban, de- 
pend upon the countenance of Young Napoleon for their promo- 
tion ; or, perhaps of moment, that General Sickles, to whom we 
especially refer, is alleged to have charge of the har'& task of steering 
him through his troiibles ; for these oflFsets to their credit, are en- 
tirely eclipsed, and the defence of Napole'^n made perfect, by the 
shrewd and powerful jproofs presented in his behalf in such con- 
vincing terms as "noble leader" — "gallant, indomitable and un- 
conquerable chieftain," and "glorious Little Mac !" 

There is a saying, however, that even the best actors on the stage 
are the very worst judges of the play ; and on the strength of that 
great truth we will, while granting the sincerity of these gentle- 
men, take the liberty of again looking behind the curtain, and ot 
making a diagnosis of the principal performer. 

To begin, then, at the beginning,— for even the prologue of a 
mighty tragedy is of moment, — we will glance at one or two of our 
hero's antecedents which bear upon the action. 

George B. McOlellan was born in a Free State, and after receiv- 
ing his education at West Point, embarked upon the world with a 
lieutenantcy . He, for a long time preferred to take up his residence 
in the South, and soon became conspicuously known as the per- 
sonal friend of Beauregard, and a man of very strong Southern 
proclivities and feelings. 

At an early period, we find McOlellan deeply identified with 
Southern filibustering schemes, and finally trace him to a promi- 
nent command in the Lone Star Association. The objects of that 
organization were notoriously, the expansion and perpetuation of 
American slavery, by the forcible conquest of Cuba and its annexa- 
tion to the South ; and it is plain that McOlellan, from his intimate 
intercourse with the leaders of the movement, was fully versed in 
all the secret aims of the conspiracy. The Philadelphia Daily 



Neios, of July 28, thus briefly states the leading features of tte 
moTement : 

" Q-eneral Quitman, of Mississippi, was chosen G-enerallissimo. 
The five officers next in rank to him were also to be Americans, 
and officers of the regular army. To General Quitman was confi- 
ded the delicate duty, not of selecting, but of purchasing, the 
swords and hearts of these. 

"He was a m.an of address. The offer was liberal, the terms heiiig 
a cash payment of $10,609, with Cuban contingencies to each, and 
he succeeded in completing contracts with Albert Sidney Johnson, 
Grustavus "W". Smith, Mansfield Lovell, J. K. Duncan and George 
B. McOlellan. 

"Smith and LiOTellreceiTed their money, resigned from the 
army, and entered upon their new duties. But before the final 
arrangements were consummated with our future General-in- 
Chief, Marcy, then Secretary of State, in yiolation of the plighted 
faith of President Pierce (who was himself a filibuster) directed 
the Collector of the Port of Mobile to seize and detain the two 
vessels laden with arms and munitions of war, then lying in that 
port. His subsequent acts prevented the expedition. The question 
of Lieutenant McClellan's resignation was held in abeyance some 
days, when the inducements to it were necessarily withdrawn." 
fv The editor of the JVews might also have stated, in this connection, 
that previous to these nefarious " Lone Star" m^ovements, McOlel- 
lan had been stealthily despatched to Cuba by Jefi"erson Davis, 
then Secretary of War, on a mission of military observation, as 
the secret service records of the Government undoubtedly will 
show. 

The failure of the Lone Star Expedition left our young hero 
without any definite prospects, but his good fortune kept Jefferson 
Davis at the head of the War Department , and that excellent man, 
having always regarded McOlellan with exceeding favor, and wish 
ing to reward him, probably, for his syiTipathies with the South, 
promoted him to be a captain of infantry, and then raised him to the 
dazzling station of Chief of the Commission oi Observation which 
represented the army of the United States before Sebastopol. True 
to these souvenirs, and the tendencies which they created, he, after 
his return, united himself with the Breckeniidge Democracy, 
the plot of which, on the part, at least, of its Southern engineers, 
was to either throw the election to the " House," or, by the return 
of Lincoln to the Presidency, to seize the opportunity for revolit- 
tion. 

Now, these antecedents, though they do not affect with absolute 
suspicion, the firmness of McClellan's loyalty,furni£h us the cue to 
a problem which for a long time bewildered us in the extreme ; and 
we can now understand the secret of that wondrous approbation 
with which the high appointment of the young Captain was receiv" 
ed by Southern generals and Dixie journals. The veil was lifted, 
too, from what had puzzled us the most, and that was, the miracu- 
lous unanimity with which every man of secession principles 
and doubttul loyalty among us, agreed upon his transcendent tal- 
ents as a chieftain. Loyal citizens would occasionally differ on his 
merits ; but if a man ever so lightly tinged with "Southern rights" 
would come in hearing, the peace patriot would be sure to fly into 
a rage, look threateningly at the critic, as if he more then suspected 
him to be an abolitionist, and swear that everybody was in a con- 
spiracy to ruin poor Little Mac ! It is true that hundreds of loyal, 
well-meaning men honestly did the same thing ; but while there 
were some among them who did not, the secessionists adored and 
lauded him without exception. Throughoitt the South the same 
phenomenon was visible, and we would continually hear the Con- 



federate journals saying, that the Yankees had but one gi-eat gen- 
eral, and the aholitionists were trying to ruin him ! 

The distinguished object of such singular laudation, could 
hardly be insensible to its effects. Human nature is governed by 
a few simple laws. Vv'e love those who love us, and it is repug- 
nant to ail good feeling, to injure and despitefully use, those who 
speak well of us. By the very excellence of his nature, therefore, 
McClellan was emasculated of a great portion of that vigor and 
devil which is the lirst requirement of a fighting general, and he 
mnst have painfully felt, in his moments of self-examir ation, that 
it was his misfortune to be so universally appreciated. There 
■was one course, however, that was still open to him, and which 
would obviate the stern necessity of shooting off " Our Southern 
Bretheren's" heads, and arms, and legs. A course, too, which, in 
the end, might be acquiesced in by Jeff Davis himself, and give no 
unappeasable offence, even to Beauregard, or his confrerers of the 
Lone-Star Expedition. 

This was a great country ; it had great institutions and great 
oceans on either side of it. The American eagle ought to flap his 
wings over the entire continent for the benefit of millions yet un- 
born. It was a shame for "6ro<7iers" to be fighting in this way about 
trifling points of difference, and the thing must be "fixed up." He 
(McClellan) was just the man to do it. In the South, he was Han- 
nibal ; in the North, Csasar and Napoleon together ; and he might, 
therefore, under the scope of his great place, so manage his cam- 
paign, as to drive the enemy into a convention, instead of into battle 
aVo'utrance. He was backed by the resources of a great country^; 
he felt that he could demonstrate his superiority to his confederate 
rivals as a soldier, to the same extent he had outstripped them 
as a student In the Academy, and, when at last, by bloodless 
strategy he should have them cornered, he would signify to them, 
they had better lay down their arms, be good and loyal citizens 
again, and he would arrange matters so that everything "would 
be lovely," and they would have all their " rights." 

We do not positively assume this theory in his faver, but it is 
entirely consistent with his known loyalty ; and to say the truth, 
it is the best we have. And if perchance we are correct, we can 
almost imagine the broad and humane expression- which spread 
over his benevolent countenance as this superb idea irradiated 
and relieved the previously agitated depths of his philosophic 
mind. In the dim vista of the future, he might behold himself 
toga'd on a pedestal, crowned with the olive as well as with the 
laurel, and continually alluded to by poetic orators as the second 
" Father of his Country." 

"We find much to harmonize with this idea. His dehut was made 
with the announcement that we would carry on the war with as 
little loss of life as possible, and we have seen that, though the 
enemy, in vastly inferior numbers, kept thrusting the rebel flag 
under his nose at Fairfax Court House ; nay, at Munson's Hill for 
several months, he would not give our "Southern brethern " 
battle. They even blockaded the Potomac on him; nay, with one- 
third his numbers they reduced him to a state of siege, and made 
daring raids upon his lines from day to day ; but the he ur had not 
come to strike the crushing blow (perhaps *o needlessly exasperate 
the feelings on both sides), and he bore the taunts and humiliations 
of h;s position with wondrous fortitude. What probably was the 
most embarrassing part of his position, was the restless chafing of 
the 2Qe,eeo bayonets at his back, for an advance ; and the only con- 
solation that could possibly have supported him in his trying sit- 
uation was the consciousness that his motives were correct, acd 
that his plan would bring the country out all right in the end. 



6 

He was rather unlucky though, for the war was terribly exasper- 
ated in the "West by Halleck, Foote, Grant, Pope, Mitchell, Wal- 
lace, Curtis and Sigel; and in the South-West by that rare old Gov- 
ernor Ben Butler, Farragut and Porter; and in the South-East by 
Burnside, Sherman and Dupont. The East, where we had the 
most troops and the greatesl general, was the place where nothing 
was done at all. 

It was something to our Young Napoleon, nevertheless, that the 
People kept gazing upon him in a sort of admiring trance, and, 
though they could not by any means penetrate his plans, they 
hurrahed for his am.azing silence and inaction, and offered to " bet 
their lives (as fifty thousand did, and lost thera) that Little Mac 
wasn't keeping so still for nothing, and that by-and-by he would 
come out all right." 

At length. Little Mac did move; and on his own judgment he 
chose the route to Richmond, by the way of the Peninsula. It was 
not a very direct road, for it obliged him to embark and debark a 
vast army, and make a long trip by sea— a process that is always 
somewhat demoralizing to troops, and always very filthy. The cost 
of the job was worth, in cash, probably some fifty millions — a 
sum for which he could have bailt ten railways, and defended 
them as they went, from Washington to within ten miles of Rich- 
mond. 

The choice of route was therefore thought to be a little singular, 
and some querulous civilians likewise thought it strange, that 
having so long refused the opportunity to strike the enemy at Ma- 
nassas, with quadrupled numbers in his favor, he should take a 
roundabout road, for so great a distance, to receive odds against him 
self. This, however, was regarded as impertinent, and the Young 
Napoleon went his way, backed by the hopes and confidence of the 
whole nation. He took 129,090 men with him, which was all he asked 
for at that time. He requested more, and the Government forward- 
ed the divisions of Franklin and McOall, and others, until he had 
received 150,000 men; and there was l>ut 19,022 lett behind, for the 
defence of Washington. The Government which has been so 
roundly villified for not having sent him more, coiild not spare an- 
other soldier, for the divisions of McDowell and Banks were the 
necessary stays against the enemy at Fredericksburg and Warren- 
ton, and there was no surplus in commission. The Young Napo- 
leon might, however, have had them all, had he remained at Wash- 
ington, and moved with them upon Richmond from that point; for 
he would thus have been enabled to cover the Capital and the 
valley of the Shenandoah at the same time, and to have kept the 
odds, too, on his own side. 

But he preferred a more profound and complicated policy, and 
the result of it was, that the enemy caught him right in the midst 
of his brilliant strategy, and drove him pell-mell out of it, so that 
he burned his tents and stores, and fled for a week, leaving his 
guns in large numbers, and his wounded and his dead behind him. 
Instead ot driving the enemy to the wall, they ran Jiim into the 
mud, and brought him to a terrible standstill for months. The 
main results, therefore, of his brilliant strategy are, that he has 
cost the country about five hundred millions of dollars, prolonged 
the war at least a year, reduced his army practically to 70,000 men, 
and in addition to paralyzing it for months, as he once before par- 
alyzed thegrand army of the Potomac, he has actually water-logged 
the navy also, for he has " tied up" several hundred vessels (trans- 
ports and men-of-war), in the simple duty of feeding and protect- 
ing him. The minor results of his genius are, the dejection of the 
country, a deluge of shinplasters, the sneers of Europe, the hisses 



of Oxford, the invigoration of the rebel cause in Parliament, and 
the confident side whisper of old Palmerston to his rampant Com- 
mons, that a few weeks longer will bring a still better chance for 
interrention. Well might the French Princes and Beau Astor 
leave him in disgust, and well might he send forth his military 
orators to notify the People, that his acts are sacred from analysis, 
and that he is a great general, for they know it. 

Now, we have arrived just at the point of this article where we 
wish to state, that we believe he is neither a great general nor a 
clever man; and to further express our conviction, that he is en- 
tirely unfitted, by reason of mental inferiority, for any broader 
military task than the management of a brigade. 

There are many ways of testing intellectual capacity, and we 
Jinow of no case easier for this purpose, than McOlellan's. He is 
a military adept, and he cannot plan; a soldier, and he cannot 
fight ; a scholar, and he cannot write. There is not one of his 
despatches that will beat the analysis of a schoolboy ; not one of 
Ms bulletins which is not bloated with bombast; not one of his 
statements that is not vague, foggy, or "purely unintelligible." 

He fijst sprang into the public ring, at Rich Mountain, like an 
acrobat or a rope dancer. The battle of that name was really per- 
formed by Kosencranz; but though a simple operation, it was well 
conceived, and, notwithstanding McClellan was not present, it, by 
tie laws of practice, accrues to his credit, as the senior officer.* 
"Well do we bear in mind, the tenor of the telegram by which he 
announced this victory to the world ; and we here put it as a point 
of inference, whether a man, who, after years of laborious scholar- 
ship, can be so grossly inexact in the deliberate use of words, can 
reasonably be expected to exhibit any mental method in planning 
a campaign ; or, to develope accuracy, while arranging his bat- 
talions amid the perturbations and the heat of action 1 

" The success of to-day," says our Napoleon, "is all that I could 
desire. We captured six brass cannons, of which ojie is rifled, all 
the enemys' camp equipage and transportation, even to his cups. 
The number of tents will, probably, reach two hundred, and 
more than sixty wagons. Their killed and wounded will amoitnt 
to fully one hundred and fifty, .with one hundred prisoners." 
* * * yftgiV retreat is complete. * * I may say we have driven 
out some ten thousand men. * * * Then, after some further 
grandiloquent display, Napoleon closes with the following liter- 
ary cross, between the styles of Mr. Merriman and Uriah Heap. 
" I hope the General -in-Ghief will approve my operations." 

"Does the razor hurt you, sir ?' says the barber, when conscious 
of his lightest touch. "A little applause if you please, ladies and 
gentlemen!" imploringly looks Mr. Merriman, as he crosses his 
legs and throws out his fingers from his lips, after a clever sum- 
merset. There is but one step between the sublime and the ri- 
diculous : so the public, not looking for a mouatebank, and being 
struck with this strange style, picked little Mac up for a Napoleon! 

Then came the proposition for a bloodless war— imagine the old 
Napoleon doing that !— next came the cruel exoneration of Gen. 
Stone, for his sacrifice and defamation of the heroic Baker, who 
was immolated to their united blunders at Ball's Bluff; next, 
Napoleon's low-toned reflection upon the misfortunes of a brother 
officer (who would have harvested his victory but for the creature 
Patterson), by pompously proclaiming "no more retreats, no 
more defeats, no more Bull Run afi".airs." Theu followed his re- 
peatedly pretended preparations for a battle, and his prescient 

*~By the same rule, however, he is fully responsible for the 
dreadful blunders and "butchery of Ball's Bluff, for that, the first 
of his operations as Commander-in-Chief, was planned and ordered 
by himself. 



8 

declaration, that the closely impending conflict -would be " short, 
sharp and bitter," though time has revealed that, while saying so, 
he did not mean to fight at all. During all this while, he went rid- 
ing up and down the lines, assuring 'the boys" that if they would 
" stick by him, he would stick by them," and occasionally telling 
them, in the imperial vein, to have no fear, for he would expose 
his sacred person, with them, in the dangers of the field. 

We next find Young Napoleon at Yorktown, before the head oi 
an army, with which Old Napoleon would have marched all over 
Secessia, and back again, in six months; but instead of taking 
the meager city by assault, and giving the North and East an op- 
portunity to sqiiare accounts of glory with the West, his bloodless 
strategy was again put in play, and he distributed the shovel in ; 
stead of drawing forth the sword. At length the confederates' 
having detained him long enough to secure the arrival of their 
reinforcements from the South, made, at their leisure, a masterly 
retreat, the details of which lasted through four decorous days. 
Nay, a single spontaneous rebel, with a solitary gun, which he 
fired on his own hook all night, after the confederates were gone, 
stayed the progress of our army for several hours more. Now 
mark what our Napoleon did. He did not throw up redoubts be- 
fore that man — though under his Crimean affliction of mud iipon 
the brain, he must have been sorely tempted to such course — but 
having ascertained that the enemy had indeed marched out, he 
Immediately sent off a handful of despatches, stating in set terms, 
that he had won a brilliant victory ! Yes, victory was the word ! 
Nay, not satisfied with this, and though the enemy had burned all 
their refuse, and lost not a single wagon, the little Mars on the 
following morning sent of another llood of telegrams, announcing 
that our victory, at Yorktown, had proved to be even more hril. 
liarit than he had at first supposed. This gross misuse of language 
would seem to indicate either a conscious want of fighting prestige 
(did we say of courage 1), or an ignorance of the true weight of 
words : but if neither this nor that, then he must have intended to 
foist a false idea on the public. JBut the climax of this grand ab- 
surdity was yet to come, and it did come, in the shape of anoUiei 
telegram, so miserable in its character, so measly with humility, 
that our cheek still tingles at our share of the loss, sustained 
through it, by general human nature. 

" May I be permitted to allow my troops to inscribe Yorkicww on 
their banners, as other generals have done ?" 

This is so pitiable, and, for a commander-in-chief, so deplorably 
mean-spirited, that we do not care to dwell upon the ijicture. It 
could hardly look worse if he had sent the same application to 
Jeff. Davis, on the su ject of the Chickahominy ! But the confed- 
erate "Commander-in-Chief" had undoubtedly "approved of 
his operations" in that quarter ! 

Next came the affair at Williamsburg, where the rear guard of the 
enemy, finding us pressing after them too closely, turned grandly 
back and gave us bitter battle. The fight lasted for some seven hours. 
Gren.McClellan according to his custom arrived upon the field after 
the strife was over, and having reined up near Hancock's brigade, 
was made cognizant of their brilliant closing chare. Ignoring, 
thereupon, all other features of the day, he sent off a dispatch in 
■which he gave credit to that brigade alone. Tnat credit was, doubt- 
less, well deserved, but it had been earned by an incidental opera- 
tion, lasting not over forty minutes, while the divisions of Hooker, 
and Keese, and Kearney, and the Excelsior Brigade of Sickles, 
had t een breathing the red flame of battle for six or seven hours. 
The other reports, however, exhibited the gross injustice of this 
single compliment, and, at the end of several days, we find Napo- 
leon reK^ctantly putting forth another bulletin, in which he says. 



in substance, that had he knoion, when writing his fir=t despatch, of 
the gallaiii services performed by such and such divisions and bri- 
gades, he would hare done them justice at the time, and in degree 
as he should learn who else behaved with spirit, he would award 
th^ni equal praise. Was ever any confession, that was extorted, 
under threatened consequences, more abject and significant than 
this 7 

Bat there is a crowning absurdity ana contradiction yet to come, 
as in the case of the Yorktown telegrams, only we regret to say, 
that the climax, in this case, is more serious than in the other, a :d 
hardly reconcileable with ordinary common sense. Two or three 
days after this latent recogniion of a brave army's toils and sacri- 
flees, General McClellan reviewed Hancocks brigade, and having 
expressed a few words of warm eulogium, he is reported to have 
said, " You saved our army from disgrace !" Was ever statement 
like this heard before from a commander, about his army 1 Who 
was it that, but for this small squad, would have betrayed us to 
disgrace 1 Was it the corps iV armee of the grim old Heintzelman 1 
Was it Hooker's or Kearney's, or Sickles' gallant men 1 Or, was it 
any, or all of the regiments whose prowess he had recognized but 
two or three days before 1 We do not wish to press the matter, and 
we hope it is not true. If it be not, it should be denied, for it is too 
heavy a weight for even Ajax to carry with decorum, down the 
aisles of history. 

The next despatch of our hero relates to the battle of Fair 
Oaks, where Casey's skeleton division was precariously posted 
on the far side of the river, and so far in front, as to invite 
the assault of some forty thousand men. This exposed hand- 
ful of inexperienced troops, lately recruited from Pennsylvania 
and New York, of course recoiled, as did the veterans at Shiloh, 
under the stunning blow ; nevertheless, and though himclreds 
of them strewed the field, th y rallied, and bravely with- 
stood the pressue of the superincumbent foe for full three 
hours, at the astounding cost, in killed and wounded, of one- 
third of their entire number. The Commander-in-Chief, according 
to the reports, did not arrive upon the field until the fight was 
fairly over. Then gathering the details, probably from fugitives, 
he dashed ofi" a despatch which he ostentatiously dated " From the 
Field of Battle !" in which he virtually denounced the whole divi- 
sion of the old veteran, as cowards. Lo, in about ten days after- 
ward, he was obliged to swallow one-half this despatch, as he did 
'that of Williamsburg, and to acknowledge that he, the Comman- 
der-in-Chief, who dated his despatch soblushingly "from the field 
of battle," had heenmisin/ormed about the matter. The other half, 
however, still rankles in the hearts of many a man and woma:,. in 
the Empire ardthe q,uaker States, whose sons and kinsmen drench- 
ed that cruel field in expiation of the fatal strategy of Young Na- 
poleon. The shabby recompense was perforce accepted, but not a 
citizen of either State, whose stranded youth have been thns fear- 
fully defamed in death, can lightly pass it from the mind. And it 
Is because of this wrong, that we can now say to the anonymous 
wretches who have flooded us with obscene and insolent epistes 
about these articles, that we personally feel we o .ve no more undue 
and criminal forbearance to McClellan's blunders. 
, But he was not yet done with despatches, even in relation to this 
battle ;forin the face of the fact that the enemy had driven him from 
his camp with the loss of many gun?, and that they had slept upon 
the very battle ground, our Young Napoleon announced from his 
waist-deep location in the marsh, that he had gained a decided ad- 
vantage over them, and secured a better position than before. Subse- 
quent events have shown, however, that if theposition to which he 



10 

■was tlms inglor ionsly pushed was better, tbe former must have been 
hell itself. This is certainly a fair conclusion, for in a few days 
afterward, he was driven from the last, at a cost of 15,000 men and 
about thirty caunon ; while nothing but the strange valor of our 
soldiers, and the talent of their able marshals, combining with the 
fortunate drunkenness of certain Confederate Grenerals, saved our 
whole force from absolute destruction.- The latter series of actions 
which effected this result, opened at 3 o'clock on the morning of 
the 26th June, but McOlellan did not make his .appearance on the 
field lantil some four or five hours afterwards. The fight thus 
opened, lasted seven days, but though we have read all the print- 
ed letters within our reach, about the matter, we fail to fiad 
more than one mention of K.ipoleon, during the prolonged melee, 
and that mention spoke of him and his staff as riding briskly to the 
rear, while whole columns were sweeping the other way to the 
attack. A strange epilogue to the " stick by me and I'll stick by 
you" orations ! 

Yes, at the close of affairs, we get another glimpse of him, but 
then he had made port, and was high up in the rigging of th.eGalena, 
With a spy-glass in his hand, surveying the turmoil on the shore. Ue 
mayhave been in the center of every hot encounter, dealing death 
upon the rebels with his own good sword, but we have failed to 
hear of it ; and it has not been our good fortune to find a single tri- 
bute fro -n any mercurial reporter, describing the modern Napo- 
leon's coolness v. hen some ball fell near him, or noticing the pleas- 
ing smile which overspread his face, when the dirt thrown up by 
some adjacent shell, consecrated him with the real baptism of bat- 
tle. These reports are so usual in campaigns, that it is singular 
they should be omitted in this case, and the conclusion therefore 
is, either that the reporters were exceelingly remiss, or that no 
such scenes of signal hardihood occurred. 

The first despatch which our young Commander wrote in rela 
tion to this week of battles, was, as the London Times has said 
about his plans, " purely unintelligible." By dint of study, how- 
ever, and acute translation, we gather from it, the general idea, that 
he has outmanaged the enemy, though by these repeated successes 
it seems he has been terribly reduced, and forced again to relin- 
quish the musket for the spade, and find shelter between his gun- 
■feoats and redoubts. 

The despatch which announced this fiasco to the world, again 
claimed an improvement of position, and with the deliberate inten 
tion of imposing on the country, Napoleon announced that he had 
lost but one siege gun. The claquers took this as a cue for their 
hosannahs, and encouraged by this unexpected demonstration, our 
hero sent off a semi-official letter, stating that the enemy had re- 
treated. It was probably true that but one "siege" gun had been 
lost, but we were entitled to know how many guns of other calibre 
and fashion were lost with it. It was not true, in any point of 
view, however, that the enemy ha.d retreated, forMcClellan knew 
perfectly well, that they, having driver him to a cowering shelter 
nnder the protection of his men-of-war, had merely fallen back to 
a position consistent with their base of operations. 

"We have thus traced oar Young Napoleon throughout the opera- 
tions of this war, and while we find that nine-tenths of the hopes 
of the nation were centered on his genius, he proves to be the only 
chieftain who has brought disaster and disgrace upon the country. 
Liook at him from what point ot view we will, he is certainly the 
most extraordinary G-eneral who ever figured on the page of his- 
tory. He is either a genius or he is nothing, for he follows none of 
the ordinary theories, and does everything by inversion. He does 
not believe at all in the policy of attack; he sees no moral loss or 
disadvantage in enduring siege from inferior numbers ; and, with 



11 

a principle of strategy, not very well established, prefers to fight 
against heavy odds, to haying them. The President required him to 
move upon Manassas, but he obeyed against his will, and every bat- 
tle in the Peninsula has been forced upon him by the enemy. When 
he arrived before Yorktown, with his 12e,000 men, there were but 
8,000 Confederate troops within its walls, and had he then instituted 
an assault, and moved thenceforward promptly upon Richmond, 
he might have escaped the disastrous results which were the toiigh 
rewards of his week of victor;/. It cannot be denitd that, but for 
the gun-boats which now cover him with their tremendous en- 
gines, his army, which was to " drive the enemy to the wall," 
would be taken " stock and lluke," and he, perhaps, be figuring in 
a pen in Richmond. And let us say, that we believe this the only 
way in which he will ever get to Richmond, from his present supe- 
rior position, unless, by the providence of God, some man more 
able than himself, shall make a diversion upon the rebel capital, 
that will enable him to co-operate ; or, unless, he crawl out of the 
Peninsula on his transports, back to the true base of operations 
before Washington. 

But he should not be entrusted again with a superior command. 
His policy is too inexplicable, and he has cost us enough already. 
The little mud fort which he built for his friend, Pierre Tontant 
Beauregard, and the place assigned him in the Lone-Star move- 
ment, behind his associates Sidney Johnson, J. K. Duncan, Mans- 
field Lovell and G-ustavus Smith, give the full measure of his value. 
Nay, if we are to take the word of his admirers, he has furnished 
it himself ; for, conscious of his own defects, he humbly asked the 
President to be deposed from his high place— and asked it virtually 
in favor of a man who started in the race for eminence behind him. 
Alas, for human glory, and particularly for that kind of glory 
which could not keep its seat, with seven hundred thousand bay- 
onets and a Nation at its back. 

And this is the chieftain who we are told is a "great genius," "a 
second Napoleon," "a glorious, gallant and unconquerable lead- 
er," and who we are forbidden to discuss, on pain of General 
Sickles' suspicion and displeasure. But, to use a common phrase, 
this system of dragooning is "played out," the wand of Little Mac 
is broken, and the public, which furnishes the men and foots the 
bill, is thinking for itself. We can therefore inform Gen. Sickles, 
with all the modesty becoming a civilian, that the People of the 
city of New York, in particular, have of late been very busy in 
forming opinions in this matter, and we can assure him, also, that 
many of the best democrats among us, believe, that if this "gifted" 
chieftain had died a year ago, the war would have been over, and 
this country again happy and united. 

And they have muchcausefor this belief, forthsy sawMcClellan 
unaccountably restrain the chafing army of the Potomac for eight 
months ; and they now behold him outdoing his earlier strategy, 
by paralyzing the navy also, and, with urgent cries of help, not 
only weakening the maritime resources of Mobile and New Or- 
leans, biit virtually raising the blockade of Charleston harbor. 
May Heaven protect us from such geniuses ! The public at large, 
though it may not be able to manage an army, can reason on causes 
and results ; and New York, which has been so lavish of its means 
and men, has a full vote in desiring to be relieved of a leader who 
is so unlucky. Generals are usually court-martialed for such 
reverses as have happened to McClellan, and there are instances 

history, where unlucky leaders have had the additional misfor- 
tune to be shot. General Sickles may rest assured that he cannot 
resurrect his idol by mere epithets and spells of prestige ; nor can 
Young Napoleon himself regain his ground even by the mostgra- 



12 

cious devotion of his talents to the duties of the hospital. His army 
•will not revolt, as has been threatened, even if he be removed; for 
they, like the clearer-sighted public, must, by this time, be willing 
to try if a ne w leader may not bring, at least, a change of fortune. 

"We would, therefore, respectfully'suggest to our friend. General 
Sicljles, that he had better fire his blank cartridges of laudation 
Without impugning the intentions and motives of his equals ; and 
would advise, that if he be really anxious to recruit his regiments, 
he offer pledges to our shrinking citizens that, if ihey will but en- 
list, they shall not be consigned to the fatal leadership of the Caesar 
of the Ohickahominy. 

Finally, if G-eneial Sickles would still defend the genius of his 
patron, he will perhaps favor ns w^ith a little light upon one 
lingering question. The Public, without being too importunate, 
would like exceedingly to know, why our noble army was allowed 
so long to canker in the camps of the Potomac, while the rebel 
flag, in presence of the Capitol, flouted the manhood and prestige 
of the nation 1 It cannot be that the rising Captain bound himself 
to the unknown interest which put him forward for the dizzy eminence 
of chief comynand to pursue a prescribed policy, should he hi appointed 1 
for his pride and loyalty would have discarded such prescription, 
as soon as he found it working adversely for the country. He 
must have had other reasons; and what those reasons were, and 
why, with his superabundant troops, w^hich were equally sea- 
soned with the enemy's, he did not "push" the ragged, feeble and 
retiring rebels o/ Manassas " to the wall," should no longer be a 
mystery. 

At this late date, General McClellan, who has received so many 
favors from the country, will probably have not the least objection 
to disclose. He can communicate his answer without hesitation, 
and confidentially, if he desire, for we will tell nobody but the 
public, and we are all friends here, G. "W. 




IM 



